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FAIRNESS OVER FINALITY: PEÑA-RODRIGUEZ
V. COLORADO AND THE RIGHT TO AN
IMPARTIAL JURY
Katherine Brosamle*
“It must become the heritage of our Nation to rise above racial
classifications that are so inconsistent with our commitment to the equal
dignity of all persons.”1

I. INTRODUCTION
The jury room has been described as a black box, shielding the
deliberative process of juries from public scrutiny and courts’
examination. With its recent decision, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado,2
the Supreme Court cracked open that box to remedy the influence of
jurors’ racial bias on deliberations and, ultimately, verdicts.
Although the Court has decreed that “[d]iscrimination on the
basis of race, odious in all aspects, is especially pernicious in the
administration of justice,”3 the intersections between race and the
criminal justice system have long been and still are deeply flawed and
inequitable. African Americans account for thirteen percent of the
United States general population but forty percent of the United States
incarcerated population, and Hispanic Americans account for sixteen
percent of the United States general population but nineteen percent
of the United States incarcerated population.4 These disparities are the

* J.D. Candidate, May 2019, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., History, University
of California, Los Angeles. I wish to thank Professor Samuel Pillsbury for his wisdom, guidance,
and support throughout the writing process. I am also grateful to the members of Loyola of Los
Angles Law Review for their diligent work and feedback. Finally, special thanks to my family for
their constant love and encouragement.
1. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 867 (2017).
2. 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
3. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979).
4. Leah Sakala, Breaking Down Mass Incarceration in the 2010 Census: State-by-State
Incarceration Rates by Race/Ethnicity, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 28, 2014),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/rates.html.
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result of deep, systemic issues, one facet of which the Peña-Rodriguez
Court addressed: the jury.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to an “impartial
jury,”5 yet this right is not always afforded to defendants. Despite the
procedures in place for careful jury selection, individuals with deep
prejudices are often nonetheless empaneled on juries. When such
individuals participate in jury deliberations, the risk that their biases
may influence other jurors and the verdict is substantial.
In the initial criminal trial that gave way to the Peña-Rodriguez
decision, one biased juror passed through the voir dire process
undetected.6 The juror was empaneled and subsequently vocalized his
strong anti-Hispanic biases during jury deliberations.7 Recognizing
that Peña-Rodriguez, a Mexican American, had not been convicted by
an impartial jury, two jurors attempted to reveal the other juror’s
biased comments to the Court.8 Their testimony, however, was
rejected, and the motion for a new trial was denied due to Colorado’s
no-impeachment rule.9
Much like its federal counterpart, Federal Rule of Evidence
606(b), Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b) prevents trial courts from
accepting juror testimony regarding the jury’s deliberative processes
in most cases, so as to protect the black box and finality of verdicts.10
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court properly found that
an exception to the no-impeachment rule was necessary under the
Sixth Amendment. Part II of this Comment discusses the history of the
no-impeachment rule from its common law origins to its codification
in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Part III outlines the factual and
procedural history of the Peña-Rodriguez case, and Part IV breaks
downs the Court’s reasoning. Part V argues that the Peña-Rodriguez
decision is (1) consistent with both precedent and the judiciary’s role,
(2) necessary in light of the insufficiency of the voir dire process, and
(3) not a threat to the jury system or finality of verdicts. Part VI
critiques the majority’s holding for allowing the lower courts too much
discretion in implementation. Finally, Part VII concludes that the
Peña-Rodriguez decision was both proper and necessary, but the
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 861–62.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 862.
Id.
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Supreme Court must continue to enforce the principles set forth in the
holding so that the goal of protecting Sixth Amendment rights can
come to fruition.
II. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
Although Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) was not codified until
1975, its origins trace back to an English civil trial that occurred nearly
two hundred years earlier.11
In 1785, the Vaise v. Delaval12 jury found itself evenly split,
unable to determine whether a defendant should be held liable, until
an easy solution presented itself: a coin toss.13 This capricious method
ultimately left two jurors wary, and after the verdict was announced,
they came clean.14 Accordingly, the losing party’s counsel attempted
to petition the court for a re-trial.15 Lord Mansfield denied the motion,
holding that “[t]he Court cannot . . . receive such an affidavit from any
of the jurymen themselves,” for the conduct described constituted a
“very high misdemeanor.”16 Through Mansfield’s refusal to accept the
jurors’ affidavits that impeached themselves, the “no-impeachment”
rule was born.
As a matter of common law, all American courts have adopted
some variation of Mansfield’s no-impeachment rule, albeit with
“extraordinary variation.”17 Two primary versions developed from
this blanket rule in the early American courts: (1) the Iowa Rule and
(2) the Federal Rule.18 The more flexible Iowa Rule has been adopted
in approximately twelve jurisdictions and allows juror testimony
regarding everything but one’s own mental deliberative process.19 For
example, the Iowa Rule would allow for juror testimony if a juror was
approached by a party or attorney or if a verdict was rendered in an

11. Josh Camson, History of the Federal Rules of Evidence, A.B.A. (2010),
https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/trial_skills/061710-trial-evidence-federalrules-of-evidence-history.html
12. 99 Eng. Rep. 944, 944 (K.B. 1785).
13. Andrew J. Hull, Unearthing Mansfield’s Rule: Analyzing the Appropriateness of Federal
Rule of Evidence 606(b) in Light of the Common Law Tradition, 38 S. ILL. U. L.J. 403, 409 (2014).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Vaise, 99 Eng. Rep. at 944 (emphasis added).
17. See Mark Cammack, The Jurisprudence of Jury Trials: The No Impeachment Rule and the
Conditions for Legitimate Legal Decisionmaking, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 57, 63 (1993).
18. Id. at 67–68.
19. Id.; see Wright v. Ill. & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195, 210–11 (1866).
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“improper manner,” such as by a game of chance.20 It would not,
however, allow for juror testimony regarding a juror’s personal
misunderstanding of the court’s instructions, a juror’s miscalculation
of damages, or “other matter resting alone in the juror’s breast.”21
Alternatively, the Federal Rule only allows for juror testimony
regarding “facts bearing upon the question of the existence of any
extraneous influence, although not as to how far that influence
operated upon [a juror’s] mind.”22 In practice, whereas the Iowa Rule
allows for testimony regarding the jury’s method of decision-making,
the Federal Rule excludes such evidence. 23
In 1975, Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
included Rule 606(b), a codification of the no-impeachment rule.24
The Advisory Committee’s initial draft of Rule 606(b) read much like
the Iowa Rule, prohibiting only testimony as to a juror’s mind,
emotions, or mental processes.25 However, the Justice Department and
Senator John L. McClellan intervened before the draft was proposed.26
After considering the policy concerns raised, the Committee re-drafted
a more stringent version of the rule.27 The Supreme Court accepted
this version and referred it to Congress.28 Initially, the House of
Representatives favored the Iowa Rule, while the Senate preferred the
Federal Rule.29 However after much deliberation, Congress enacted,
and the President subsequently signed, the second version of the rule.30
Accordingly, Rule 606(b) prohibits juror testimony “about any
statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s
deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s

20. Wright, 20 Iowa at 210.
21. Id.
22. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1892).
23. Cammack, supra note17, at 68.
24. FED. R. EVID. 606(b); Camson, supra note 11.
25. Cammack, supra note17, at 70; see Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the
United States Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 387 (Mar. 1971).
26. Deputy Attorney General Kliendienst from the Justice Department raised concerns of juror
harassment, and Senator McClellan worried that the lenient rule would make it impossible to
conduct trials, especially criminal trials. See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 877 n.3
(2017); Cammack, supra note17, at 71.
27. Cammack, supra note17, at 71.
28. Id. at 72.
29. Id. at 72–73.
30. Id. at 73.
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vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or
indictment.”31
The Court may only consider such juror testimony in limited
cases. First, if “extraneous prejudicial information was improperly
brought to the jury’s attention,”32 juror testimony on any such “extra
record sources” which were exposed to the jury, often through media
sources, may be acceptable.33 Second, if “an outside influence was
improperly brought to bear on any juror,”34 a juror may be able to
testify to “threats or warnings, contacts with interested parties,
lawyers, or witnesses, and even some kinds of contact with court
personnel, including bailiff and judges.”35 Finally, if “a mistake was
made in entering the verdict on the verdict form,” a juror may testify
to such human error.36
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Peña-Rodriguez’s Original Criminal Trial
In May 2007, two teenage girls were cornered in a bathroom at a
horse-racing facility by a man who made sexual advances toward them
both.37 Miguel Angel Peña-Rodriguez, an employee of the facility,
was eventually identified by the girls in a one-on-one show-up and
charged with sexual assault, unlawful sexual contact, and
harassment.38 Later that year, after a three-day trial, a jury found PeñaRodriguez guilty of unlawful sexual contact and harassment.39 One
juror’s reasoning?: “I think he did it because he’s Mexican and
Mexican men take whatever they want.”40 Citing his experience as a
law enforcement officer, Juror H.C. explained his belief that PeñaRodriguez was guilty because “Mexican men [have] a bravado that
cause[s] them to believe they [can] do whatever they want[] with

31. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
32. Id.
33. 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 6:18 (4th
ed. 2017).
34. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
35. 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 6:19 (4th
ed. 2013).
36. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
37. Peña-Rodriguez v. People, 350 P.3d 287, 288 (Colo. 2015).
38. Id.
39. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 861 (2017).
40. Id. at 862.
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women.”41 Moreover, Juror H.C. did not find Peña-Rodriguez’s alibi
credible because he was “an illegal.”42
Reminiscent of the original Vaise case, two jurors remained
behind after the jury was discharged to speak with Peña-Rodriguez’s
counsel privately.43 They informed counsel of Juror H.C.’s comments
indicating his anti-Hispanic bias towards Peña-Rodriguez and his
alibi.44
B. The Appeals Process
Peña-Rodriguez’s counsel obtained affidavits detailing the two
jurors’ descriptions of Juror H.C.’s biased statements and presented
them to the trial court as part of a motion for a new trial.45 Despite
acknowledging Juror H.C.’s bias, the trial court denied the motion
because Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b)46 protects juror
deliberations from inquiry.47 Accordingly, the jury’s verdict was
finalized, Peña-Rodriguez was sentenced to two years of probation,
and he was required to register as a sex offender.48
A divided Court of Appeals and a split Colorado Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that racial bias does not fall
into one of the categorical exceptions to Rule 606(b), thus making the
jurors’ affidavits inadmissible.49
VI. REASONING OF THE COURT
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
there is a constitutionally mandated exception to the no-impeachment
rule for racial bias.50 In a 5-3 decision, the Court concluded that the
Sixth Amendment requires such an exception.51

41. Id.
42. It should be noted that Peña-Rodriguez’s alibi testified during trial that he is a legal
resident of the United States. Id.
43. Id. at 861.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 862.
46. The language of Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b) is identical to its federal counterpart,
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 862.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 862–63.
51. Id. at 869.
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After outlining the history of the no-impeachment rule and the
variations different jurisdictions have adopted,52 Justice Kennedy
went on to explain the majority’s reasoning.
Kennedy distinguished two groupings of relevant precedent:
decisions endorsing the no-impeachment rule and decisions dealing
with racial bias in the jury system. The first category, which includes
United States v. Reid,53 McDonald v. Pless,54 Tanner v. United
States,55 and Warger v. Shauers,56 tracks the Supreme Court’s
decisions involving the no-impeachment rule, both prior to its
codification and later interpreting Rule 606(b).57 Kennedy then
transitioned into the second category of precedent dealing with racial
disparities in the criminal justice system, which the Civil War
Amendments largely served as the impetus for.58 To establish that the
judiciary, and not just the legislature, has a duty to eliminate the role
of race in the criminal justice system, Kennedy summarized past
decisions whereby the Supreme Court sought to eradicate racial bias
within the jury system.59
Kennedy characterized the issue presented in this case as falling
at the intersection of these two groupings of decisions, which need not
conflict with each other for several reasons.60
First, the traditional Tanner safeguards61 simply “may be less
effective in rooting out racial bias” which is treated with “added
precaution” in the justice system.62 Moreover, Peña-Rodriguez
addresses an issue recognized in Reid, McDonald, and Warger:
whether there is a constitutional requirement that the no-impeachment
rule give way in cases of extreme juror bias.63 Finally, systemic
52. See id. at 866–67.
53. 53 U.S. 361, 361 (1851).
54. 238 U.S. 264, 269 (1915) (rejecting the Iowa Rule).
55. 483 U.S. 107, 126 (1987) (identifying the concerns supporting the no-impeachment rule
and outlining the existing safeguards to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights).
56. 135 S. Ct. 521, 529 (2014) (declining to make an exception to the no-impeachment rule in
a case involving pro-defendant bias, citing to the Tanner safeguards).
57. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 864–67.
58. Id. (noting the Civil War Amendments gave “new force and direction” to the “imperative
to purge racial prejudice from the administration of justice”).
59. Id. at 867–68.
60. Id. at 868.
61. The Tanner safeguards are outlined in detail below, but include voir dire, the visibility of
jurors throughout trial, and the admissibility of non-juror evidence detailing juror misconduct. See
infra Part V.B.
62. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 866–67.
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confidence in jury verdicts, a “central premise of the Sixth
Amendment trial right,” necessitates a “constitutional rule that
[addresses] racial bias in the justice system.”64
Accordingly, the Court determined that if “one or more jurors
made statements exhibiting overt racial bias that casts serious doubt
on the fairness and impartiality of the jury’s deliberations and resulting
verdict,” and the statements indicated that “racial animus was a
significant motivating factor in the juror’s vote,” then the noimpeachment bar can be set aside. 65 The determination of this
threshold showing was left to the “substantial discretion of the trial
court in light of all the circumstances.”66
Both Justice Thomas and Justice Alito published dissenting
opinions, with Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas joining
Alito’s dissent.67 Thomas highlighted the fact that a race-based
exception to the no-impeachment rule was not part of American
common law history in 1791 (when the Sixth Amendment was
ratified) or 1868 (when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified).68
Thus, Thomas found no constitutional basis for the majority’s
holding.69 On the other hand, the crux of Alito’s dissent was concern
that this decision, while “well-intentioned,”70 will undermine the
foundational purposes of the no-impeachment rule.71 As a
consequence of this exception, Alito fears there will be a chilling
effect on juror deliberations, increased harassment of jurors after trial,
and an undermining of the finality of verdicts.72
V. ANALYSIS
The issue presented in Peña-Rodriguez lies precariously at the
juncture between two fundamental tenets of the American criminal
justice system: equal justice under the law and the stability and finality
of verdicts. Balancing these two interests, the Supreme Court properly
found that the Sixth Amendment necessitates an exception to Rule
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 869.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 871 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 874 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 874 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 885 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 884.
Id. at 884–85.
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606(b) when a juror utilizes racial bias to reach a verdict. As set forth
below, the Peña-Rodriguez decision was both necessary and proper.
A. The Duty to Confront Racial Bias in the Justice System Is Not the
Legislature’s Alone
In his dissenting opinion, Alito gives great weight to the extensive
legislative history of Rule 606(b) that resulted in the adoption of a
variation of the Federal Rule, as opposed to the laxer Iowa Rule.73 In
doing so, Alito questions how the Court’s “seat-of-the-pants
judgment” is any more justified than the decisions made by the
legislatures responsible for drafting and adopting federal and state
evidentiary rules.74
Alito’s statement implies that Peña-Rodriguez deals with issues
best left to the legislature, thus ignoring the judiciary’s duty to
dismantle the effects of racial animus in the administration of justice.
Essential to the American scheme of justice, trial by an impartial jury
is a fundamental right.75 As Kennedy noted, the Supreme Court has a
rich history of specifically addressing laws and practices involving
race and juries.76 As early as 1880, the Court prohibited the exclusion
of jurors on the basis of race.77 The Court has routinely overturned
laws that overtly78 or implicitly79 exclude racial minorities, including
African Americans80 and Hispanic Americans,81 from being
summoned for jury duty. In 1986, Batson held that the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments guarantee defendants that the State will not
73. Id. at 877.
74. Id. at 882.
75. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
76. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 867.
77. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305–09 (1880) (holding a West Virginia statute
prohibiting people of color from serving as jurors violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
78. See Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 379–80 (1880) (invalidating a Delaware law that
restricted the selection of jurors to voting, white male citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment);
see also Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U.S. 394, 395 (1935) (per curiam).
79. Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953) (overturning a county policy of placing the
names of white prospective jurors on white cards and African American prospective jurors on
yellow cards to be drawn for service under the Fourteenth Amendment).
80. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 629–30 (1972) (finding a prima facie case of
discrimination where only 5% percent of persons summoned for grand jury venire were African
American in a county that was 21% African American).
81. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977) (finding a prima facie case of
discrimination where only 39% of persons summoned for grand jury service were Mexican
American in a county that was 79.1% Mexican American); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 480–
81 (1954) (rejecting a Texas law that systematically excluded persons of Mexican descent from
juror selection).
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exclude members of his or her race from the jury venire on account of
race, or on the false assumption that members of his or her race as a
group are not qualified to serve as jurors.82 The Court has also held
that the Fourteenth Amendment requires trial judges to interrogate
jurors about racial prejudice at the defendant’s timely request.83
Accordingly, the Court’s decision in Peña-Rodriguez is not
unprecedented. Rather, it is part of the Supreme Court’s long-standing
pattern of addressing issues of race discrimination in the criminal
justice system.
B. Peña-Rodriguez Is Consistent with Precedent
Since its codification in 1975, the Supreme Court has heard three
cases questioning the propriety of a potential exception to Rule 606(b):
Tanner v. United States in 1987, Warger v. Shauers in 2014, and PeñaRodriguez v. Colorado in 2017. In his Peña-Rodriquez dissent, Alito
characterizes the majority’s decision as an improper departure from
the Court’s prior holdings.84 Not so. Although it is incontestable that
the Peña-Rodriguez decision creates a new exception to Rule 606(b),
it does so within the framework established by the Court’s earlier
precedent.
Even before Rule 606(b) was codified, the Supreme Court
considered cases involving the common-law no-impeachment rule. As
early as 1851, the Supreme Court acknowledged that while juror
testimony “ought always to be received with great caution,” there may
be cases “in which it would be impossible to refuse [such testimony]
without violating the plainest principles of justice.”85 The Court again
echoed this concern in 1915, noting an exception may be needed “in

82. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986); see also Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472,
483 (2008) (holding a prosecutor’s alleged reasons for striking an African American juror were
implausible under the Batson framework); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628
(1991) (holding peremptory challenges may not be used to exclude jurors on account of their race
in civil trials); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 355 (1991) (prohibiting prosecutors from
making peremptory challenges to exclude Hispanic Americans based on their ethnicity).
83. Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 529 (1973); see also Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S.
28, 36–38 (1986) (holding a defendant accused of an interracial capital crime is entitled to have
prospective jurors informed of the race of the victim and questioned on the issue of racial bias);
Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 190 (1981) (holding that unless a defendant is
accused of a violent crime against an individual of another race or ethnicity, the trial court has
discretion to determine if voir dire inquiry as to racial bias is necessary).
84. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 882 (2017).
85. United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 361, 366 (1851).
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the gravest and most important cases.”86 Nearly a century later, the
Court again acknowledged that “[t]here may be cases of juror bias so
extreme that, almost by definition, the jury trial right has been
abridged.”87 Justice Sotomayor, writing for the Warger Court, noted
that “[i]f and when such a case arises, the Court can consider whether
the usual safeguards are or are not sufficient to protect the integrity of
the process.”88 Peña-Rodriguez was that case. Accordingly, the
Court’s decision in Peña-Rodriguez finally addressed the question left
open by the Reid, McDonald, and Warger Courts.
In Tanner, the Supreme Court declined to make an exception to
Rule 606(b) in order to allow for juror testimony regarding jurors’
drug and alcohol use during trial.89 The Tanner Court justified this
decision by highlighting the protective mechanisms already in place
which protect defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights.90 For example,
“during the trial the jury is observable by the court, by counsel, and by
court personnel,” as well as by each other, and such behaviors could
have been reported prior to when the verdict was rendered.91
Additionally, the trial court may hold a post-trial evidentiary hearing
to impeach the verdict by non-juror evidence of juror misconduct.92
Finally, there is the key protective mechanism of voir dire.93
The Court’s decision in Peña-Rodriguez does not undermine the
Tanner holding. In Tanner, the present safeguards should have been
sufficient, and the Court’s holding was rational within the facts
presented. There is, however, a significant difference between juror
misconduct occurring throughout trial in the courtroom and juror
misconduct occurring behind closed doors while shielded in the
privacy of deliberations. The safeguards outlined in Tanner are still
relevant in light of Peña-Rodriguez; Peña-Rodriguez merely adds an
additional safeguard to defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to an
impartial jury.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 269 (1915).
Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 529 n.3 (2014).
Id.
Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 124–27 (1987).
Id. at 127.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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C. The Tanner Safeguards Are Insufficient for Rooting out Racial
Bias Among Juries
1. Issues with Relying on Voir Dire
In Peña-Rodriguez the only conduct at issue occurred during
deliberations; there was no evidence of juror misconduct during trial.94
Only a fellow juror could have reported Juror H.C.’s misconduct.
Accordingly, the only potential Tanner safeguard at play in PeñaRodriguez was the voir dire process.
Roughly translated, voir dire means “to speak the truth.”95 It is
the “preliminary examination of a prospective juror by a judge or
lawyer to decide whether the prospect is qualified and suitable to serve
on a jury.”96 The Supreme Court has consistently recognized the voir
dire process as a means of rooting out juror bias so as to achieve the
selection of an impartial jury.97 Yet, the adequacy of this procedure is
dubious.
In Peña-Rodriguez, Kennedy noted that the Tanner safeguards
simply “may be less effective in rooting out racial bias.”98 This is not
the first time this concern has been raised.99 There is a substantial body
of scholarship which calls into question the effectiveness of the voir
dire process in determining the impartiality of prospective jurors.100
For example, one study conducted at the federal trial court level
determined via post-trial interviews that the voir dire process “did not
provide sufficient information for attorneys to identify prejudiced
jurors.”101 Two commonly cited explanations for the insufficiency of
94. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 861 (2017).
95. Voir Dire, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
96. Id.
97. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143–44 (1994) (“Voir dire provides a
means of discovering actual or implied bias and a firmer basis upon which the parties may exercise
their peremptory challenges intelligently.”); Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431 (1991) (“Voir
dire examination serves the dual purposes of enabling the court to select an impartial jury and
assisting counsel in exercising peremptory challenges.”).
98. Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.
99. See, e.g., United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 87 (1st Cir. 2009) (“In our view, the four
protections relied on by the Tanner Court do not provide adequate safeguards in the context of
racially and ethnically biased comments made during deliberations.”).
100. See Valerie P. Hans & Alayna Jehle, Avoid Bald Men and People with Green Socks? Other
Ways to Improve the Voir Dire Process in Jury Selection, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1179, 1186–90
(2003) (surveying various studies that demonstrate the ineffectiveness of voir dire in detecting juror
biases).
101. Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and
Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491, 492, 528 (1978).
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the voir dire process are (1) the role of trial judges and (2) the tendency
of prospective jurors to conceal bias.102
Voir dire is not self-executing. The suitability of a prospective
juror cannot be revealed without proper questioning. In other words,
“the power of voir dire depends on how the process is conducted and
to what extent issues are probed.”103 The determination of how voir
dire will be conducted and what will ultimately be asked is largely a
matter left up to the discretion of the trial judge, especially in federal
court.104 This is done to balance the interests of “effective[ly] . . .
obtaining an impartial jury” and “reasonable expedition.”105 With
mounting concerns over the congestion of trial courts, judges are left
to streamline the jury selection process to cut time and costs.106
Federal District Court Judge Marvin A. Aspen described the
“hybrid” voir dire practice used in many federal courts as follows: “the
judge conducts voir dire and usually asks the attorneys to submit, in
writing, questions the attorneys may wish the judge to ask.”107 This
streamlined process limits the ability of lawyers to inquire into biases
that may impact their client’s interests because judges may not
approve submitted questions or may fail to pursue further inquiry
when a juror provides an ambiguous answer. Moreover, when judges
act as the questioners in voir dire, “interviewer bias” may lead jurors
to “quickly pick up on a judge’s expectations and mannerisms and then
attempt to provide an answer that they think will meet with the judge’s
approval.”108 In sum, limited voir dire increases incidents of
undetected juror bias.109

102. Leah S.P. Rabin, The Public Injury of an Imperfect Trial: Fulfilling the Promises of Tanner
and the Sixth Amendment Through Post-Verdict Inquiry into Truthfulness at Voir Dire, 14 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 537, 552–53 (2011).
103. Id.
104. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a); FED. R. CIV. P. 47(a).
105. The Jury System in the Federal Courts, 26 F.R.D. 409, 465–66 (1960).
106. Jeffrey M. Gaba, Voir Dire of Jurors: Constitutional Limits to the Right of Inquiry into
Prejudice, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 525, 531–32 (1977).
107. Mark A. Drummond, Voir Dire: Don’t Let the Judge Cut You Out, A.B.A.,
https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/articles-print/050412-practice-pointsspring12.html.
108. Rachael A. Ream, Limited Voir Dire: Why It Fails to Detect Juror Bias, CRIM. JUST.,
Winter 2009, at 22, 25.
109. See id. at 25–26; Limited Voir Dire: An Inadequate Safeguard of the Constitutional Right
to an Impartial Jury, MICH. J. RACE & L. (Jan. 22, 2016), https://mjrl.org/2016/01/22/commentlimited-voir-dire-an-inadequate-safeguard-of-the-constitutional-right-to-an-impartialjury/#_ftnref30.
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Inherent in the voir dire system is the risk that, “even assuming
adequate trial and pre-trial tools for screening and excising juror bias,”
jurors may misrepresent their biases, either intentionally or
unintentionally.110 Voir dire often fails to reveal jurors’ biases because
the “superficial questions” often asked of jurors regarding their biases
are unlikely to prompt disclosure, as “[g]eneral questions do not reach
hidden inconsistent attitudes, which research has shown are now
prevalent about race.”111 It can often take a more detailed and focused
line of questioning to prompt a juror to admit to racial bias. Moreover,
jurors may not answer honestly, especially to questions involving
racial biases. Societal pressures may prevent a juror from honestly
admitting their own prejudices publicly, but that does not mean the
biases have been eliminated, just simply repressed.
2. Proof of Voir Dire Insufficiency
Concerns about the insufficiency of voir dire are not just
theoretical. One need not look far to find concrete examples of juror
bias escaping past the jury selection process. For example, during
Keith Tharpe’s capital murder trial, one juror repeatedly referred to
Tharpe by derogatory names and later told Tharpe’s attorneys that she
“wondered if black people even have souls.”112 On September 27,
2017, the Supreme Court stayed the execution of Keith Tharpe relying
on the principles set forth in the Peña-Rodriguez decision.113
Many others have not been as fortunate as Tharpe, however.
Before James Shillcutt was convicted of soliciting prostitutes, one
juror in deliberations stated, “Let’s be logical; he’s a black, and he sees
a seventeen year old white girl—I know the type.”114 During the
deliberations for the trial against Walter Smith, Jr., one juror strutted
around like a minstrel mimicking a black dialect to mock Smith and
110. Jessica L. West, 12 Racist Men: Post-Verdict Evidence of Juror Bias, 27 HARV. J. RACIAL
& ETHNIC JUST. 165, 204 (2011).
111. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611, 1675
(1985) (“Asking a general question about impartiality and race is like asking whether one believes
in equality for blacks; jurors may sincerely answer yes, they believe in equality and yes, they can
be impartial, yet oppose interracial marriage and believe that blacks are more prone to violence.”).
112. David Beasley, Supreme Court Halts Georgia Execution of Man Convicted of 1990
Murder, THOMSON REUTERS (Sep. 26, 2017, 3:08 A.M.), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usageorgia-execution/supreme-court-halts-georgia-execution-of-man-convicted-of-1990-murderidUSKCN1C114R.
113. Id.
114. Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that evidence ofracial
comments could not be used to impeach jury verdicts under Rule 606(b)).
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his attorney.115 Smith was subsequently convicted of first degree
murder.116 Just before an all-white jury convicted nineteen-year-old
Darrell Jones of first-degree murder, one juror attempted to persuade
the remaining holdout by arguing that Jones was guilty because he was
black.117 Kerry Dean Benally was convicted of assault with a
dangerous weapon after the foreman stated “‘[w]hen Indians get
alcohol, they all get drunk,’ and when they get drunk, they get
violent.”118 The Tanner safeguards did nothing to preserve the Sixth
Amendment rights of Shillcutt, Smith, Jones, or Benally.
Similarly, voir dire failed to protect Peña-Rodriguez. In his
criminal trial, the trial court and counsel’s questions to the venire
included whether any potential jurors: (1) “had ‘any feelings for or
against’ either party,” (2) were “in law enforcement or had family or
close friends in law enforcement,” (3) would be unable to “render a
verdict solely on the evidence presented at trial and the law,” (4) “had
taken ‘law classes of any kind,’ and (5) “thought this would not be a
‘good case’ for them to serve as a ‘fair juror.’”119 Jurors were also
presented the opportunity to speak privately with the court.120
Nonetheless, Juror H.C., a former law enforcement officer who
believes Mexican men “have a sense of entitlement” and are
“physically controlling” of women, was selected as a juror.121 The
only answer of Juror H.C.’s which the Court questioned was his
response that he had taken “classes in real estate and contract law.”122
Neither his apparent anti-Hispanic biases nor his law enforcement
experience were revealed at any point during the voir dire process.123
Juror H.C.’s selection reveals the insufficiencies of voir dire in
exposing and rooting out racial bias.

115. Smith v. Brewer, 444 F. Supp. 482, 485 (S.D. Iowa 1978), aff’d, 577 F.2d 466 (8th Cir.
1978).
116. Id. at 484.
117. Jenifer McKim, Three Decades Later, Juror Tries to Set Record Straight, NEW ENGLAND
CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Sept. 2, 2017), https://www.necir.org/2017/09/02/threedecades-later-juror-tries-set-record-straight.
118. United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1231 (10th Cir. 2008) (alteration in original).
119. People v. Peña-Rodriguez, 412 P.3d 461, 465(Colo. App.2012).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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D. Race Based Exceptions Have Worked in Many States
The Center on the Administration of Criminal Law surveyed case
law in all jurisdictions that allow courts to consider juror testimony of
racial bias in deliberations.124 The survey identified thirty cases from
sixteen different states, the District of Columbia, and the First and
Seventh Circuits where courts as early as 1967 have inquired into the
impact of a juror’s racial bias in deliberations.125 Of those cases,
sixteen resulted in a new trial or hearing, and fourteen did not.126 The
Court also found that although Oregon has a codified racial-bias
exception, there was no published case law applying it.127 Similarly,
while the Ninth Circuit has expressed support of a race-based
exception, it has not yet needed to apply such an exception.128 In sum,
the experiences of these twenty different jurisdictions over the past
several decades indicate that allowing for a race-based exception to
the no-impeachment rule has not resulted in substantial motions for
retrial or overturn rates, increased harassment of jurors, or a
weakening of the finality of verdicts. There is no reason to think that
the experience of other jurisdictions in light of the Peña-Rodriguez
holding will be any different than that of these nineteen jurisdictions
prior to the holding.
VI. CRITIQUE
Although the use of the Peña-Rodriguez decision in the stay of
Tharpe’s execution appears promising, the stay was only granted by
the Supreme Court after the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court’s
denial of Tharpe’s petition.129 In their decisions, both the district court
and the Eleventh Circuit focused on the “discretion” reserved to the
lower courts in the Peña-Rodriguez holding.130
In the majority’s holding in Peña-Rodriguez, the Supreme Court
twice makes explicit reference to leaving the mechanics of

124. Amici Curiae Brief of Center on the Administration of Criminal Law in Support of
Petitioner, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017) (No. 15-606).
125. Id. at 20–21.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 21 n.7; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.335 (1981).
128. See United States v. Hayat, 710 F.3d 875, 886 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v.
Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 2001)).
129. Tharpe v. Warden, No. 17-14027-P, 2017 WL 4250413, at *3 n.5 (11th Cir. Sept. 21,
2017).
130. Id.
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implementing this new exception up to the discretion of the state and
lower courts.131 Unfortunately, this discretion left to the lower courts
in the majority’s holding may inhibit actual progress towards rooting
out racial bias from jury deliberations.
In the months following the decision’s announcement on March
6, 2017, four circuits addressed the implementation of PeñaRodriguez. As mentioned, in ruling on Tharpe’s petition, the Eleventh
Circuit acknowledged but did not apply the Peña-Rodriguez
holding.132 The Third and Sixth Circuits have similarly acknowledged
but not applied the holding, distinguishing it from the cases at issue.133
Most disconcertingly, the Fifth Circuit quickly “decline[d] the
invitation” of Peña-Rodriguez, finding this step in the “relentless
march toward a color-blind justice” to be “antithetical to the privacy
of jury deliberations.”134 Playing into the same slippery slope
argument that Alito endorsed in his dissent, other courts may likewise
opt to maintain the status quo to the continued detriment of
defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights given the discretionary language
used in the majority’s holding.
VII. CONCLUSION
Miguel Angel Peña-Rodriguez, Keith Tharpe, Walter Smith Jr.,
Darrell Jones, and Kerry Dean Benally all deserved fair trials in front
of an impartial jury. The Supreme Court correctly held the Sixth
Amendment requires the no-impeachment rule to give way where
there is evidence of a juror’s overt racial bias. If the Supreme Court
truly stands for the principles of equality and justice extolled in the
opinion, it must defend this exception and continue to enforce the
principles set forth in the Peña-Rodriguez holding so that the Sixth
Amendment protection set forth by the Constitution and re-affirmed
by the Court can come to fruition.

131. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017) (“Whether that threshold showing
has been satisfied is a matter committed to the substantial discretion of the trial court in light of all
the circumstances, including the content and timing of the alleged statements and the reliability of
the proffered evidence . . . . The practical mechanics of acquiring and presenting such evidence will
no doubt be shaped and guided by state rules of professional ethics and local court rules, both of
which often limit counsel’s post-trial contact with jurors.”).
132. Tharpe, 2017 WL 4250413, at *3–4.
133. United States v. Angel-Huerta, 718 Fed. Appx. 105, 110 (3d Cir. 2017); United States v.
Robinson, 872 F.3d 760, 771–72 (6th Cir. 2017).
134. Young v. Davis, 860 F.3d 318, 333–34 (5th Cir. 2017).
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